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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

DOXEY-HATCH MEDICAL CENTER/
AMBER PETERSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.

NO. 940543-CA

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Division of Health Care
Financing,
Defendant-Respondent.
* * * * * * * * *

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT
DOXEY-HATCH MEDICAL CENTER/AMBER PETERSON
* * * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner's Brief and Respondent's Brief set forth the
relevant facts in detail.

However, Petitioner takes exception

with a portion of Respondent's Statement of the Case where, at
page 3, Respondent states that preadmission authorization to
readmit Amber is "required by applicable federal and state
Medicaid requirements."

As pointed out in Petitioner's Brief at

pages 15 and 18, there is no federal requirement that there be
preadmission authorization upon a return to a nursing home from a
hospital.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner almost totally ignores Petitioner's Brief wherein
the argument is made that under the facts of the instant case the
denial of reimbursement was unreasonable and irrational in this
case.

Rather, respondent simply states that Rule 455-9-6G

required the filing of Form 10A upon return to the nursing home
facility from a hospital stay in excess of three days.
Respondent's Brief simply relies upon Rule 455-9-6G and the
ruling in South Davis Community Hospital Inc./Romero v.
Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing, 869 P.2d
979 (Utah App. 1994) ("Romero") without giving any real analysis
to the application of the ruling in that case to the facts of
this case.

Furthermore, Respondent states that because of the

holding in Romero, Petitioner's appeal must be deemed to be
frivolous and therefore subject to sanctions under Rule 33f Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

As shown by Petitioner's Brief and

the Reply Brief, Respondent's Brief and position is wrong on all
counts.
POINT I
PETITIONER'S APPEAL WAS NOT FRIVOLOUS
Respondent claims that Doxey-Hatch raises precisely the same
legal issue that was resolved in the Romero case, to-wit:
"DHCF's discretion to interpret and authority to implement its
utilization review procedures to avoid losing federal matching
funds for Utah's Medicaid program" and "whether DHCF could
reasonably deny Medicaid reimbursement to a provider/facility
based on the facility's failure to comply with preadmission
authorization requirements."

(Respondent's Brief at page 14.)

Based on Respondent's view that Romero has dealt with these
issues in the past, Respondent argues that Petitioner's appeal is
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frivolous and subject to sanctions pursuant to Rule 33, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
However, Respondent fails to properly interpret the Romero
case.

In Romero. the court stated that, under the applicable

standards for review, it must be determined whether DHCF exceeded
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.

The facts of the

instant case, as well demonstrated in Petitioner's Brief, are
substantially different from those in the Romero case.

The main

difference is that in the Romero case, Romero had never gone
through a preadmission screening procedure whereas in the instant
case Amber Peterson had been prescreened and had been on Medicaid
for at least two years prior to the period of time in issue.
Additional facts pertaining to the unreasonableness of
Respondent's position and differentiating this case from Romero
are set forth in Petitioner's Brief.
When the standard of review of DHCF's action is
"reasonableness and rationality," as stated in Romero, each case
is obviously very fact-specific.

In other words, the question

must be asked whether DHCF acted reasonably and rationally in
this particular case based on these particular facts.
Furthermore, Petitioner's Brief addresses additional issues
not raised in Romero, to-wit:

that DHCF's decision to deny

reimbursement was inconsistent with prior rulings (page 20) and
that the rule, when read literally, does not require the
submission of a new Form 10A upon return to a nursing home from a
hospital (page 22). Respondent has, for inexplicable reasons,
- 3 -

elected not to even address these arguments in its brief.

Since

these additional issues are not covered by Romero. this Appeal
certainly cannot be frivolous.
As shown by the above, and contrary to the assertions in
Respondent's Brief (pages 14 and 15), there are reasonable legal
and/or factual questions which this court has not previously
determined in Romero.

Consequently, this appeal is not

frivolous.
POINT II
CONTRARY TO RESPONDENT'S ALLEGATIONS.
DHCF'S DENIAL WAS NOT REASONABLE OR RATIONAL
In Point II of its Brief, Respondent simply makes the
argument that DHCF reasonably denied reimbursement and that there
are no facts or circumstances that make it unreasonable for
denying reimbursement.

Respondent's Brief simply ignores, for

the most part, all of Petitioner's facts and arguments regarding
why the actions of DHCF were unreasonable and irrational.
Respondent's argument is simply:

(a) Rule R455-9-6G requires a

new Form 10A upon return to the hospital after a three-day
hospital stay; (b) no form was submitted; and (c) therefore, no
reimbursement.
Obviously, it is not appropriate for Petitioner to restate
all of these facts and arguments in this Reply Brief.

However,

Petitioner strongly urges the Court to consider the facts,
circumstances, and arguments set forth in Petitioner's Brief and,
particularly, the facts that Amber was previously screened and
- 4 -

approved for Medicaid, had been on Medicaid for two years, had no
change in her condition or treatment following her return from
the hospital, Petitioner has had only a few instances in the past
when it did not comply with the Form 10A requirement, that the
failure to submit a new Form 10A was due to extenuating
circumstances easily understandable by any reasonable person,
that DHCF has acknowledged in correspondence that Petitioner has
always been conscientious in doing its paper work and that it
would like to grant relief, that in over 9 million Medicaid days
in the last five years DHCF has granted relief in only two or
three cases, and that DHCF has, in fact, adopted a new rule
subsequent to the occurrence that is the subject matter of this
case giving providers some leeway in submitting the Form 10A.
All of these factors indicate that it would be reasonable and
fair to allow reimbursement in this case and, on the other hand,
to deny the same would be unreasonable.
Beginning at page 9 of its Brief, Respondent gives an
Overview of Utah's Medicaid and Utilization Review Programs.

It

quotes from Utah Code Ann. §26-18-2.3(1) to the effect that DHCF
has been given the responsibility of implementing the Medicaid
program "in an efficient, economical manner" and that DHCF shall
establish a program to "safeguard against unnecessary or
inappropriate use of Medicaid service, excessive payments, and
unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or lengths of
stay."

Respondent's Brief also quotes from §26-18-2.1 wherein it

states that DHCF shall deny any claim for services that fail to
- 5 -

meet criteria established by DHCF "concerning medical necessity
appropriateness."

Concerning these two sections of the Code, it

is obvious from the facts of the case that it was not necessary
to deny reimbursement to Petitioner in order to "safeguard
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services,
excessive payments, or unnecessary or inappropriate hospital
admissions or lengths of stay" because Amber was clearly
certified for Medicaid and there is no question that her level of
care and treatment was appropriate for her circumstances.

There

is no question, as required by §26-18-2.1, that Petitioner did
meet the criteria established by DHCF for "medical necessity
appropriateness."
Respondent also quotes Utah Admin. Code Rule 455-9-6G which
is the rule that requires a new Form 10A after a hospital stay of
more than three days.

However, as set forth at page 22 of

Petitioner's Brief, that is not exactly what that rule provides.
That rule states that "preadmission authorization will not be
required for a hospital admission when the recipient returns to
the original nursing care facility within three consecutive days
. . . of admission to the hospital" [emphasis added].

Thus, this

rule simply doesn't apply to this case because we are not talking
about a preadmission authorization for a hospital admission.
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POINT III
RULE R455-9 EXCEEDS FEDERAL
REQUIREMENTS AND IS UNREASONABLE
In Point III of its Brief, Respondent tacitly acknowledges
that Rule 455-9 is in excess of the requirements of federal law
regarding preadmission screening.

In this regard, see pages 15

and 18 of Petitioner's Brief wherein the CCH Medicare and
Medicaid Guide is quoted as stating that federal law does not
require preadmission screening upon return to a nursing home
facility from a hospital and that the preadmission screening
requirement only applies to new admissions.

Respondent simply

relies upon the statutory language which gives DHCF the
discretion to implement criteria to safeguard against unnecessary
utilization of care and services by Medicaid providers.

However,

Respondent again conveniently ignores the fact that Amber was
qualified for Medicaid for two years following an initial
prescreening and subsequent utilization and need reviews, and
that her level of care did not change after she returned to
Doxey-Hatch from the hospital.

In no way would Utah's Medicaid

funds be jeopardized, as alleged by Respondent (pp. 13, 14), by
eliminating or relaxing the rule on preadmission screenings or at
least the timeliness of submitting Form 10A (as has been done as
a matter of fact by the adoption of the new rule allowing 30
"grace" days per year).

Respondent also ignores the facts

recited in Petitioner's Brief regarding the total number of
Medicaid patients in Utah, the total number of Medicaid days in
- 7 -

Utah, and the fact that DHCF has only granted two or three
exceptions to its strict rules in the past which, Petitioner
argues, is proof in and of itself that these rules are unduly
strict, unreasonable, and irrational.
POINT IV
DHCF'S DECISION IS ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE
IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR
CASES IN WHICH PAYMENT WAS ALLOWED
As set forth beginning at page 20 of Petitioner's Brief, the
Court should find that the decision by DHCF to deny payment is
inconsistent with prior cases in which payment was made and is
therefore arbitrary and capricious.

Respondent's Brief does not

address this issue because, presumably, Respondent knows that
they have granted exceptions to this hard and fast rule in the
past of requiring a Form 10A after a readmission from a hospital.
Based on the prior exceptions and inconsistent rulings, DHCF's
ruling should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, DHCF's decision denying DoxeyHatch Medicaid reimbursement for the period September 6, 1993
through November 30, 1993 should be reversed.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED DECISION
Because there are factual differences in the instant case
from the Romero case, oral argument is requested.

Furthermore,

it is requested that the decision in this case be published.
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Respectfully submitted this

A

day of April, 1995,

/4 /W^

William L. Crawford
Attorney for Petitioner
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

/

day of April, 1995, I

mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY
BRIEF, postage prepaid, to the following:
A. Stephen Mikita
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

WILLIAM L. CRAWFORD
Attorney for Petitioner
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